PDF | On Dec 1, , David Skidmore and others published Security: A New you have obtained prior permission, you not download an entire issue of a . Security: A. New Framework. for. Analysis. By Barry Buzan,. Ole Weaver, and. Buzan, Barry - Security_ a New Framework for Analysis - Download as PDF File ( .pdf), Text File .txt) or read online. Security. SECURITY SECURITY A New Framework for Analysis Barry Buzan Ole Wæver Jaap de Wilde LYNNE RIENNER PU BLISH ERS BOULDER.
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Human Security Civil Society Group Emergency Measure Referent Object Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for. SECURITY SECURITY A New Framework for Analysis Barry Buzan Ole Wæver Jaap de Wilde LYNNE RIENNER PU BLISH ERS BOULDER LONDON Contents . Available in the National Library of Australia collection. Author: Buzan, Barry; Format: Book; viii, p.: ill. 24 cm.
The book opens the analysis to a wider range of sectors pg. The different character and dynamics of security are examined in five sectors: military, political, economic, environmental and societal. In each of the sector chapters, there is a subsection which tries to understand the location of the security dynamics of the sector.
In other words it asks whether the security dynamics of the sector are local, regional or global. Moreover, both global and local levels are significant for the environmental sector pg. The main contribution of the book to the literature is that it takes an explicitly social constructivist approach to understanding the process by which issues become securitized.
Securitisation is accepted as a successful speech act but it is argued in the book that the security speech act is not defined by saying the word security.
In securitization, an actor tries to move a topic away from politics and into an area of security concerns by talking security. The process of securitization is not a question of an objective threat and a subjective perception of a threat. Much of the conceptualization and writing of the book has been a gen uinely joint enterprise, with all of the authors making substantial inputs into every chapter. But different parts do have distinctive individual stamps.
Barry Buzan was the main drafter of Chapters 1, 3, 5, and 9; was largely responsible for the sectoral approach; and took overall responsibility for editing and coordinating the work. Ole Wver was the main drafter of Chapters 2, 6, 7, and 8, as well as the third section of Chapter 9, and was the primary supplier of the securitization approach to defining the subject.
J aap de Wilde, the newest member of the Copenhagen research group, was the main drafter of Chapter 4 and the first two sections of Chapter 8, made substantial inputs into Chapters 5 and 9, and restrained the other two from taking a too unquestioning position toward realist assumptions. Wehave received a great amount of help with this project. First and foremost, our thanks to the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, whose generous grant made it possible for Buzan to devote his main attention to this book during the years , for us to assemble a team of experts who provided continual critical scrutiny, and for the support of the cost of a research assistant.
The Great Depression is the classic example of a chain reaction shredding the entire fabric beyond calculated risk. The international debt crisis in the early s is another example of disaster traveling fast through the international economic system and testing its resilience.
This possibility underlies and justifies much of the economic nationalist position focusing on the dangers of exposure under liberalism and also of the liberal attempt to securitize protectionism as the supposed cause of systemic crises. Such views may well justify The Economic Sector securitizing responses to events that are less than threatening to the entire system but that may trigger chain reactions. How does liberal security logic deal with systems whose organizing principles are themselves defective in the sense that they create a significant probability of systemic crises Polanyi ?
What does it mean to protect the stability of a system if the system is a threat to itself? The typical case here would be a chain reaction collapse of credit that might result from the huge resources now being gambled on futures and derivatives. It is difficult to know in what sense, if any, one can think of such prospects as threats to the system, although one way into the problem may be to think in terms of threats to the joint gains fostered by the LIEO.
The other obvious way to think about threats in security terms is to shift to thinking of systemic crises as threats to the units states, firms, IGOs within the system. Here, it might be argued that what matter are the speed and scale of fundamental change—its shock value. If Japan dropped out of the world economy tomorrow e. But if an economic power like Japan diminishes slowly and gradually— say, over a period of one or two generations, as Britain has done albeit not without two world wars —the system can adapt to the process.
Social security systems cushion the blow of unemployment and are also important in preventing a spillover of economic conflicts into political ones. Banks may play a similar role for firms. But these examples all concern measures to help individual units that get into trouble. Most either cease to function or are swept away if the system itself collapses.
Central banks operate more and more independent of national governments, and their representatives meet regularly to discuss and coordinate policy in forums such as the Bank for International Settlements and the International Organization of Securities' Commissions Underhill The major OECD banks are also connected by hot lines to enable immediate communication and coordination in case of a crisis.
Such measures suggest a serious and sustained response to threats against economic security at the system level. The securitization of systemic crises runs up against the arguments made earlier that within the economic sector, existential threats constitute a fairly narrow range of conditions.
These discourses of securitization are part of the ideological disputes about policy for the political economy. When pure liberalism is in the ascendant, few economic security claims will be able to surmount the hurdle that insecurity is the price to be paid for participating in the global market economy.
Under this logic; losers are part of the game, and their attempts to securitize their plight are dismissed as attempts to change the rules of the game. Regionalizing Dynamics? Are the main trends in the security dynamics of the economic sector local, regional, or global?
Another, as shown earlier, is that whereas the strictly economic logic The Economic Sector of security is rather narrow, economic dynamics have many security effects in other sectors. These linkages are what underpins IPE as a cross-sectoral enterprise.
Unlike military and political relations, economic ones are currently little affected by geography and distance. Many markets particularly financial ones now operate globally, and it is no longer an exaggeration to speak of a global economic system. Indeed, some writers e. The successful industrialization of areas outside the The Economic Sector West has increased the size of markets. Surplus capacity intensifies competition and results in deindustrialization when older producers have become uncompetitive.
This globalizing of economic efficiency is good for consumers, but it places tremendous pressures of adaptation on states and societies, which have continually to reconfigure the way in which they earn a living. In older developed areas such as Europe, intensified trade competition confronts states and societies with major questions about social and political values.
The long, drawn-out saga of the GATT Uruguay Round was the bellwether of this gathering crisis in which the pursuit of economic efficiency creates societal and political costs that are increasingly difficult to sustain in a democratic political context.
The barely successful conclusion of the round in December reflected a desperate hope that further liberalization would stimulate sufficient overall growth to stave off the accumulating social and political problems. Left unaddressed is the underlying tension between the economic realm on the one hand and the political and societal realms on the other and the intensifying pressures for protectionism these tensions feed.
The second set of pressures concerns the financial liberalization that has been underway since the s. Trade would be deregulated, but finance would not, and a system of stable exchange rates would facilitate trade. Financial deregulation has both undermined the welfare state in some places, such as the UK, intentionally so and blown away any hope for exchange rate stability.
The development also opens up the possibility of a major financial crisis resulting from overextensions of credit, like the one that triggered the Great Depression. The combination of these three factors—weakened U.
A major economic breakdown would have repercussions not only in the economic sector but also in terms of political and military security. Regional Dynamics Interestingly, a strong connection seems to exist between global concerns about the security of the LIEO and securitizing dynamics at the regional level. Economic regionalism Helleiner b; Anderson and Blackhurst ; Fawcett and Hurrell has come back into fashion as a result of the widening and deepening of integration in the EU since the late s and the construction of NAFTA.
The most ambitious of these projects, the EU, trundles onward despite all of its difficulties and has unquestionably become the central focus of security in Europe Buzan et al. Regionalization comes in many different forms of integration, with many different degrees of identity, depth, and institutionalization.
Perhaps the main difference is that between formal, rule-bound, institutionalized The Economic Sector versions e. As with the global level, the regional one can be securitized in itself or can overlap with securitizations at the state and individual levels.
The debates about the European Monetary Union have this overlapping quality. Given the intrinsic mobility of so many economic factors, in purely economic terms it would make as much sense for Britain to be linked with North America or Japan as to be part of the EU. The most obvious answer is that economic regionalism is a response to globalization. It can help states to cope not only with the success or failure of the LIEO but also with its day-to-day operation.
But few want to see a breakdown of the LIEO all the way down to the state level, and regions are an obvious stopping point. Additionally, technical arguments explain some regionalizing trends in spite of powerful globalizing forces. As long as economic regionalism remains liberal in its outlook, the two developments are compatible.
Economically, the trading structures are attempts to build stronger operating platforms from which to engage in the ever more intense trade and financial competition in the global market. Part of this function is about genuine economic security; the rest is about seeking an advantage in the politico-economic logic of competition within a global market. Nevertheless, the geographic element of economic regionalism is worrying to liberals because it seems to run counter to the efficiencies of a global market; it is worrying to strategists because it has echoes of the neomercantilist blocs of the s that were forerunners of World War II.
This parallel with the s seems misplaced.
Although they do not point toward preparation for war, as was true in the s, the contemporary economic blocs do have security roles in other sectors. They are, for example, politico-cultural defense mechanisms against the powerful homogenizing effects of open markets.
Liberals like to think of the global market as, ideally, a place of uniform rules and universal logics of behavior. As Eric Helleiner b points out, the three main economic groupings all have distinctive characters.
Europe is heavily institutionalized and is driven by social democratic values. It could be that part of contemporary economic regionalism is based in the desire to preserve societal security. When Islam ic and capitalist economies do relate to one another, the situation might be like that with IBM and Macintosh computer systems: The two are compatible rather than hostile, but there are permanent translation costs.
In more conventional military-political terms, some realists have viewed regionalization as an attempt to construct superpowers. The EU is commonly seen this way both by its more extreme federalist advocates and by possible rivals in the United States and Russia.
This argument was more convincing during the Cold War, when big was beautiful, and it has faded somewhat with the disintegration of the USSR and resistance to deeper integration within Europe. Localizing Dynamics Given the overwhelming force of globalization and the regionalizing responses to it, little room is left for serious security dynamics at the local level.
Even the state, which not long ago would have factored very strongly at this level, has largely surrendered to the imperatives of liberalization, with domestic debates now dominated by system-level arguments. There are, however, economic security consequences to liberalization that clearly manifest themselves at the local level.
Summary Because of the nature of economic relations under liberalism, economic security is a peculiarly difficult subject. Except at a very basic level, the logic of survival is difficult to argue within the economic sector itself.
Attempts to securitize economic issues are essentially a part of the political-ideological policy debate within IPE. In this context, the language of securitization is a way of taking economic nationalist positions in economic policy debates without having to abandon superficial commitments to the liberal consensus. Here, a clear logic of survival exists that entails obvious and drastic consequences.
Liberal orders can collapse. Nobody knows whether any given violation, defection, collapse, or crisis of confidence will be the one that begins the slide toward a comprehensive unraveling of the system. To say that economic security is difficult and blurry may be true, but this description is not very helpful.
At most, it sends a warning and invites care in the use and reception of securitization attempts in this sector. But given the desire of liberals to separate the economic sector from politics, the fact that most of the security consequences of economic liberalism turn up in other sectors is of more than passing interest.
This conclusion points toward Chapter 9, where we expand the idea of security spillovers from the economic sector as a way of understanding the imperatives behind the entire phenomenon of the wider security agenda. Much the same logic applies to concerns about security of supply.
Fears that the global market will generate more losers than winners and will heighten inequalities are not survival issues unless they undermine the provision of basic human needs. They are instead the political consequence of an economic system that requires winners and losers.